Congress Must Get Answers Before Spending More on Missile Program (2024)

Increasing costs are common in many industries but pose an insidious challenge for military acquisitions. Should a construction project, for example, go over budget, it can be canceled. However, if a defense system runs into increased costs, its proponents will claim that failing to dump ever-increasing quantities of taxpayer dollars on the program puts national security at risk.

In our system, it should be the legislature that exercises oversight of the defense acquisition process and asks tough questions about whether inflated costs are worth sustaining. However, my former colleagues in Congress don't ask uniform questions common in ascertaining the cause of cost overruns frequently enough, and instead are quick to rubber-stamp multi-billion-dollar programs without much oversight.

They will get an opportunity to practice necessary oversight of an exorbitantly expensive nuclear missile program in a public hearing July 24, and I encourage them to take it. Their constituents can also contribute by giving members of Congress some license to debate these issues by pushing back on the defense industry and hardliners' art of painting anyone who questions exorbitant military expenditure as "weak on defense."

The United States is in the middle of a massive effort to modernize its nuclear weapons programs. This process began under former President Barack Obama and had widespread support. However, the modernization process has been consistently plagued by bloated expenses and significant delays. Facing staggering cost overruns, it is time to ask which systems in the nuclear arsenal are truly critical to national security, including the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that make up the land-based leg of the so-called U.S. nuclear "triad" comprising land-, air-, and sea-based missiles.

Certain modernization efforts, like the Air Force's new ICBM replacement program known as the Sentinel, are relics of the Cold War that reflect assumptions of that era regarding the need for massive deterrence and high-alert forces that have never been thoroughly reexamined.

One tenuous rationale used for the continued presence of ICBMs is that they provide many targets for an adversary's nuclear strike, which would be strategically costly. That means U.S. citizens near these missile silos in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Nebraska, and North Dakota are also targets; conversely, because air- and sea-based nuclear weapons are by definition mobile, they provide less of a potentially attractive target for an adversary's nuclear strike. Times have changed, and with that change should come reassessment of such assumptions—particularly when they come with jumbo price tags.

Regardless, not only is the Pentagon currently engaged in replacing our ICBM force, but the cost of the Sentinel is also exploding. Earlier this year, the Air Force informed Congress that the Sentinel program will cost at least 37 percent more and take two years longer than was originally estimated. While that in itself already raises concerns, it is important to note also that this only covers the cost of the program under the Pentagon's jurisdiction and does not include funding for the Department of Energy-managed new warhead also requested as part of this ICBM replacement.

Under U.S. law, this level of cost overrun requires the Pentagon to review the program and report to Congress on whether the Sentinel is still necessary, and necessary at the proposed levels. It is imperative that the Pentagon take this review seriously and thoroughly investigate alternatives.

The real issue before Congress, however, is how the cost estimates for the Sentinel could be off by this much. A 37 percent increase for an already costly program cannot simply be glossed over when building a responsible budget, despite the alleged national security implications. Imagine the reaction to this level of overrun in a different industry. We cannot set the precedent that this kind of increase is normal and should not be questioned extensively.

My former colleagues in Congress should ask the Air Force how they underestimated the cost so grossly. Did they know the cost would ultimately be significantly higher, but they lowballed the number to get congressional approval for the program? Is there a serious methodology problem at the Pentagon? Or have they encountered delays and cost increases that they could not have foreseen in good faith? Regardless of how this happened, questions need to be answered as part of the Pentagon's review and Congress' oversight of the program.

The Pentagon has a responsibility to weigh capabilities needed for U.S. national security strategically against finite public resources. In fact, my former colleague and House Armed Services Committee ranking member Adam Smith (D-Wash.) recently raised this point effectively regarding Sentinel. He argued that, "We have to live within the budget we have," and questioned whether the triad "still makes sense" given ever-increasing costs.

There is no indication that costs will not continue to rise, and I therefore pose some questions we all should be asking, in line with what Representative Smith and others like Representative John Garamendi (D-Calif.) have asked: Is such an exorbitant ICBM replacement program really the best strategic decision? What other critical national security priorities might receive decreased funding to make up for the Sentinel's cost overruns? Even if ICBMs remain part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, is there a compromise that might be reached for a smaller ICBM force that might still provide a viable deterrent?

There still needs to be a debate on the need for ICBMs in the future, but whatever one may think of their necessity, it should be absolutely clear that something is seriously amiss with Sentinel's procurement, and that requires serious attention.

My hope is that my former colleagues in Congress will take the opportunity provided by the Pentagon's review and the upcoming public hearing to exercise their oversight role and ask these questions. As taxpayers and as their constituents, we should all demand answers.

John Tierney is a former congressman and current executive director of the nonpartisan nonprofit Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and its sister organization Council for a Livable World. Tierney represented Massachusetts' 6th district in Congress from 1997-2015, serving on the House Intelligence Committee, and chairing the National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Government Oversight and Reform Committee.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.